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The check typically operates as an instrument of payment
rather than of credit, and the drawer no doubt expects that it will
be promptly deposited or presented for payment.' The commercial
expectation of prompt presentment that attends the issuance of a
check is reflected both in the temporal nature of the liability of the
parties whose signatures are placed on a check' and in the Commer-
cial Laws'" treatment of the drawee-bank's relationship to the
drawer-customer: a "stale" check need not be paid by a drawee.' The
*Faculty Member, Louisiana State University.
1. Unless otherwise agreed, however, the giving of a check operates only as con-
ditional payment; the underlying obligation is not actually discharged by payment until
the check is paid by the drawee. See, e.g., Oxner v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 289 So.
2d 229 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Work Clothes Rental Serv. Co. v. Dupont Mfrs., Inc.,
262 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Seliga v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 174 So.
2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Cf. LA. R.S. 10:3-409(1) (Supp. 1974).
2. LA. R.S. 10:3-502 & 3-503(2) (Supp. 1974).
3. LA. R.S. 10:1-101 to 8-501 (Supp. 1974 & 1978). Section 1-101 provides that title
10 of the Revised Statutes shall be known as the "Commercial Laws." These provi-
sions represent the enactment of articles 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), with minor revisions where necessary to conform with the general
scheme of Louisiana law. Hereinafter, any reference to the U.C.C., where different
from Louisiana law, will be noted. Otherwise, any reference to "Commercial Laws" will
be to title 10.
4. LA. R.S. 10:4-404 (Supp. 1974). At common law, staleness was usually held to
put the drawee on notice of possible problems as to the underlying obligation, so that
payment was at the bank's peril. See Lancaster Bank v. Woodward, 18 Pa. 357 (1852).
Many courts put it in terms of inquiry notice-if an inquiry would not have revealed
some defense of the drawer, the failure of the bank to inquire would not make its pay-
ment of the stale check wrongful. See Goldberg v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 102
N.Y.S.2d 144 (Mun. Ct. 1951). The theory was obviously related to the doctrine that
overdueness puts a holder on notice of possible defenses.
The common law approach presented something of a problem to bankers. A
refusal to pay a stale check might be a wrongful dishonor if nothing was amiss with
respect to the underlying obligation, LA. R.S. 10:4-402 (Supp. 1974); to pay the check
was perilous if something was wrong. Accordingly, banks usually did try to reach the
drawer for instructions. Because this solution ceased to be practical, the American
Bankers Association sponsored a "stale check" statute that was widely adopted, pur-
suant to which a bank could dishonor a stale check without liability, unless expressly
instructed by the customer to make payment. Section 4-404 of the U.C.C. is based on
the ABA statute, adding to it only the provision for good faith payment. One example
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drawee may, however, pay a stale check if it does so in good faith.5
The matter of "good faith" is given only a general definition:
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."" Further-
more, all banks that handle the check are, as a general matter, obliged
to do so with ordinary care.' In the particular case of a collecting
bank" the obligation of ordinary care receives explicit general treat-
ment under the Commercial Laws, but the Commercial Laws fail to
make clear the intended relationship between good faith and a drawee-
payor bank's obligation of ordinary care.' The problem created by
the Commercial Laws' treatment of that aspect of the bank-
customer relationship surfaced in Charles Ragusa & Son v. Com-
munity State Bank.1
Ragusa had issued its check #2668, drawn on Community and
payable to Southern Masonry, on June 30, 1972;" but Southern had
apparently lost or misplaced that check. Upon being notified of
Southern's inability to obtain payment on check #2668, Ragusa
of a good faith payment of a stale check is provided by the "January stale check." At
the beginning of each new year, drawers often continue to date their checks with the
prior year's date. Bankers expect this and routinely pay such items. See Pazol v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 110 Ga. App. 319, 138 S.E.2d 442 (1964).
5. LA. R.S. 10:1-203 & 4-404 (Supp. 1974).
6. LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974). A discussion of the issue of good faith under
the Commercial Laws may be found in a previous Symposium contribution by the
author at 37 LA. L. REv. 406, 414-16 (1977).
7. See LA. R.S. 10:4-103(1) & (5) (Supp. 1974).
8. A collecting bank is defined as "any bank handling the item for collection ex-
cept the payor bank." LA. R.S. 10:4-105(d) (Supp. 1974). A "payor bank" is the bank by
which the check is payable as drawn. LA. R.S. 10:4-105(b) (Supp. 1974).
9. LA. R.S. 10:4-202(1) (Supp. 1974). Section 4-212(4) does seemingly make explicit
reference to the failure of any bank to exercise ordinary care, in its observation that
such a failure does not affect the right of charge-back, but the proper context of
charge-back does not involve the relationship between the drawee and the drawer.
Charge-back is more accurately viewed as a right of a collecting bank which has not
received final payment from a drawee-payor bank. See Official U.C.C. Comments 2, 3,
and 5, U.C.C. § 4-212. Viewed from a slightly varied perspective, the matter of a
drawee-bank's right to charge-back typically affects its relationship to the holder and
to the collecting banks rather than to its own customer, the drawer. Thus, the
drawee's concern regarding its own customer is proper payment or proper dishonor,
matters treated in sections 4-401 through 4-406; with respect to the holder and to col-
lecting banks, the drawee's concerns are finality of payment and prompt return of un-
paid items, matters treated in sections 3-418, 4-213, 4-301, and 4-302. It can also be
observed that the focus of part 2 of Chapter 4 of the Commercial Laws, in which sec-
tion 4-212 appears, is collection of items by depository and collecting banks.
10. 360 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
11. Issuance of the check pre-dated the applicability of the Commercial Laws, but
they did apply to the issue of the subsequent rights and liabilities of Ragusa and Com-
munity.
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issued a substitute check" to Southern which was ultimately paid by
Community. Contemporaneously with the issuance of the replace-
ment check, Ragusa had issued to Community a verbal stop payment
order on check #2668. More than three years later, check #2668 was
deposited for collection by Southern" in its account, forwarded to
and paid by Community out of Ragusa's account.
When Ragusa discovered that check #2668 had been paid, it
promptly" demanded that its account be re-credited. At this point,
two issues confronted Community: was check #2668-stale by some
two and one-half years-properly payable; and could the bank in any
event pay the check in light of the prior, but expired, stop payment
order? On the latter issue the first circuit correctly held that the
expired stop payment order was not relevant to the issue of the
bank's right to charge Ragusa's account." With respect to the issue
of re-crediting Ragusa's account by virtue of the staleness of the
check, Community could have opted to defend its payment on the
basis that it had paid a stale check in good faith, under section
4-404." Rather than "stand and fight" on the issue of good faith pay-
ment at that point, however, Community re-credited Ragusa's ac-
count on August 4, 1975, for the amount of check #2668.
Community had re-credited Ragusa's account in the undoubted
expectation that it would be able to return the check to the payee's
bank and revoke the provisional credit that had been given 8 at the
12. When a check has not resulted in payment-for whatever reason-the drawer
has not received a discharge on the underlying transaction, LA. R.S. 10:3-601 & 3-603
(Supp. 1974), and accordingly has no choice but to give a replacement check or make
other payment arrangements with the payee. Of course, if there exists a defense
unrelated to discharge by payment, the drawer will resist the payee's demands for a
new check.
13. There was no suggestion that Southern was in bad faith in depositing check
#2668.
14. See LA. R.S. 10:4-406 (Supp. 1974).
15. A verbal stop payment order is binding only for fourteen calendar days,
unless confirmed in writing within that period. LA. R.S. 10:4-403(2) (Supp. 1974).
16. In Granite Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Hempstead Bank, 326 N.Y.S.2d 881
(Sup. Ct. Tr. Term 1971), it was held that section 4-403 displaced any requirement that
a drawee-payor must consult a "lapsed stop order" file, or that it even maintain such a
file. Thus, the drawer must renew stop payment orders previously given, in order to
cast upon the bank the burden of following such orders.
17. Community could, for example, have argued that it, in good faith, did not
realize the check was stale; alternatively, it could have taken the position that, while it
realized the check was stale, it believed in good faith that Ragusa would, for one
reason or another, want it to honor the check notwithstanding its staleness. On the lat-
ter point, the bank could buttress its argument by pointing to the size of the
check-$5,000-and to the fact that a dishonored check payable in a sizeable amount of
money will usually lead to legal problems for the drawer.
18. See LA. R.S. 10:4-301 (Supp. 1974).
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time the check had been forwarded by payee's bank through the
Federal Reserve Bank. But, because Community had received the
check at some time shortly before July 17, 1975, an August 4, 1975
return of the check was untimely;" and the Federal Reserve Bank
returned the check to Community on August 6, 1975. Community
held the check until September 10, 1975, at which time it once again
charged the amount of the check to Ragusa's account." Ragusa then
sued for a re-crediting of the account. The issue thus framed for the
first circuit was whether Community could defend its second pay-
ment of the check, and debiting of Ragusa's account, on the basis of
a good faith payment of a check it knew to be stale by two and one-
half years. The first circuit held that it could not so defend.
Had Community not re-credited its first debiting of the Ragusa
account, it arguably could have prevailed, since theoretically a
drawee-even a negligent drawee-can defend payment of a stale
check by a showing of good faith, ie., subjective honesty in fact." By
19. Under Revised Statutes 10:4-303(1), the bank's original payment of check #2668
was final and irrevocable. Cf. LA. R.S. 10:4-302 (Supp. 1974).
20. The opinion notes that there was conflicting evidence as to whether discus-
sions were held between the parties as to return of the check, but it can safely be
assumed that Ragusa did not authorize Community to charge the Ragusa account.
21. In Advanced Alloys, Inc. v. Sergeant Steel Corp., 340 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Civ. Ct.
1973), the drawee bank had in good faith paid a check presented for payment fourteen
months after issuance. No inquiry had been made of the drawer-customer. The court
ruled for the bank under section 4-404, making this very interesting, and perhaps cor-
rect, argument of statutory construction:
Apparently, when the [U.C.C.] intends to apply a concept of "good faith" beyond
"honesty in fact," a broader definition is provided. Thus, with respect to dealings
of merchants, UCC 2-103(1)(b) states:
"'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealings in the trade."
Presumably, if it were intended to place a duty of inquiry upon a bank before
it could safely pay a stale check, a broader definition of "good faith" would have
been made applicable to this situation. It may very well be that in enacting the
[U.C.C.] consideration was given, as defendant argues, to the vast number of
checks being issued and the requirement that a bank accept or refuse to honor a
check within a short, prescribed time limit (UCC 4-301, 302), leading to the conclu-
sion that a bank should not be liable for paying stale checks as long as the bank
was honest in fact.
Id. at 267. Thus, the trial court took the view that section 4-403 had cast the burden on
the drawer to protect himself by issuing a stop payment order and, if necessary, renew
it every six months. In the absence of a current stop payment order, the bank would
have no duty to consult the drawer. This quite plausible construction of section 4-404
was reversed by the New York Supreme Court:
While UCC § 4-404 protects a bank which pays a stale check so long as it acts
in good faith, it does not eliminate the requirement of ordinary care which a bank
must observe in all its dealings. In our opinion, there is an issue of fact as to
whether under all the circumstances, defendant Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
acted with due care in this transaction.
360 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1973).
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re-crediting and then subsequently debiting a check it knew its cus-
tomer did not want paid, Community could not argue that it paid
the check in good faith.' Thus, the result reached by the first circuit
is correct; unfortunately, the court involved itself in a discussion of
"ordinary care" which unnecessarily confuses the issue: "[I]t seems
obvious that although LSA-R.S. 10:4-404 protects a bank which
pays a stale check so long as it acts in 'good faith,' it does not
eliminate the requirement of ordinary care which a bank must
observe in all its dealings."2 In point of fact, section 4-403 probably
was intended to do precisely what the court feels it does not do"'
-eliminate, for purposes of stale check handling, the duty of ordi-
nary care.2" The idea that there is an omnipresent general duty of
ordinary care on the part of the drawee-payor bank is understand-
ably compelling; but, if one accepts such a proposition, one is then
left to explain why it was necessary to specifically mention "ordi-
nary care" in, for example, section 3-406."
22. Although Professors White and Summers stuck the quill in the bull's eye
when they penned "Good faith ranks among the most slippery concepts in the [Uniform
Commercial] Code," it seems beyond doubt that the facts of Ragusa preclude the
bank's good faith. The bank, in fact, introduced no evidence supportive of its alleged
good faith. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 17-3, at 563 (1972).
23. 360 So. 2d at 234.
24. The court did not cite, but was aided in its decision by, the New York
Supreme Court's analysis in Advanced Alloys. See note 21, supra.
25. See Advanced Alloys, Inc. v. Sergeant Steel Corp., 340 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Civ. Ct..
1973). But see Advanced Alloys, Inc. v. Sergeant Steel Corp., 360 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup.
Ct. App. Term 1973), rev'g, 340 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Civ. Ct.). See note 21, supra. It is the
author's position that the view expressed by the trial court's opinion in Advanced
Alloys is correct. White and Summers disagree, but did so at a time prior to the Ad-
vanced Alloys case, citing Goldberg v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 102 N.Y.S.2d 144
(Mun. Ct. 1951), a decision rejected both by comment 7 to section 4-403 and by the
decision in Granite Leasing Equipment Corp. v. Hempstead Bank, 326 N.Y.S.2d 881
(Sup. Ct. Tr. Term 1971). See note 16, supra. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 22,
§ 17-3 at 563. The statutory construction argument found in the lower court's opinion
in Advanced Alloys, see note 21, supra, may be seen also in Prudential Insurance Co.
v. Marine National Exchange Bank, 371 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Wis. 1974):
[Clonspicuous by its absence in [section 3-405] is a requirement that the paying
or collecting bank exercise ordinary care. Compare, e.g., [sections 3-406 and 4-406].
It is clear that where the draftsman of the U.C.C. used a particular phrase in cer-
tain instances, or omitted that phrase in another, they had a different result in
mind .... [Therefore], a determination as to the bank's alleged negligence is not
relevant.
371 F. Supp. at 1003.
26. While section 3-406 is, of course, not directly affected by section 4-103's ordi-
nary care language, the preclusion rights of a payor under section 3-406 would have
been available to Community, as a payor bank, had there been negligence by Ragusa
which substantially contributed to a material alteration or an unauthorized signature.
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In the final analysis, "subjective honesty in fact" and "ordinary
care" are not totally compatible in the bank-customer area; where
the former specifically applies, the latter is implicitly made irrele-
vant. 7 To that extent, Ragusa's attainment of a correct result" pro-
ceeds along a line of statutory construction difficult to defend logic-
ally.
MARGINAL NOTATIONS
In a prior Symposium effort, the problems that attend the issu-
ance of a check bearing an "in full payment" notation were high-
lighted.' It was then noted that while the Commercial Laws contain
no express treatment of the effect of marginal notations -thereby
relegating the resolution of the issues raised to local law under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:1-103-some U.C.C. decisions had sug-
gested that Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:1-207 might permit the
creditor-payee to avoid the compromise issue, raised by the margin-
27. In fact, the bank-customer relationship has little to do with ordinary care. For
example, a showing of ordinary care will not insulate a drawee-payor bank from the
consequences of paying an item that was not properly payable, even if a reasonably
prudent banker could not have known of that fact. Items bearing skilled alterations or
forged signatures are examples. On the other hand, lack of ordinary care by a drawee
can be a negative-outcome determinant. See LA. R.S. 10:4-406(3) & 3-406 (Supp. 1974).
It is perhaps noteworthy that the preclusion idea embodied in sections 3-406 and 4-406
does not apply to stale checks.
28. A drawee-payor bank in the post-litigation posture of Community Bank is not
without a theory of recovery as against the party paid, i.e., Southern, in the Ragusa
case. Payment to Southern was a mistaken payment, that is, Southern was not enti-
tled, on the basis of any underlying obligation owed by Ragusa, to obtain payment on
check #2668. From Community's point of view, any payment that cannot be charged to
the drawer's account is necessarily a mistaken payment. Under the Louisiana Civil
Code, such a payment must be restored by the one who has received it. LA. CIv. CODE
arts. 2301-14. But negotiable instruments law has its own ideas about the ability of a
drawee bank to recover payments it has mistakenly made, ideas traceable to the
ancient case of Price v. Neal, 3 Burrow's Reports 1354 (1762). Section 3-418 of the
U.C.C. incorporates the essence of Price v. Neal by making all payments of an instru-
ment final, and therefore irretrievable, in favor of a holder in due course or a party
who has in good faith changed his position in reliance on payment. If section 3-418 is
applicable to a given case, the section displaces the underlying Civil Code law. Cf. LA.
R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974). But in the Ragusa case, payment would not have been final
in favor of Southern because Southern was not a holder in due course, see U.C.C.
§ 3-302(2), comment 2, and, in any event, could not have changed its position in reliance
on payment of a previously paid obligation. Accordingly, Civil Code articles 2301-14
would apply, and Community could obtain restitution, subject, of course, to the pre-
scriptive period. Community also would have been subrogated to the drawer's rights
against the payee. LA. R.S. 10:4-407 (Supp. 1974).
29. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Com-
mercial Paper, 38 LA. L. REV. 384, 392-94 (1978). The case there treated is Terra
Trucks, Inc. v. Weber, 346 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
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ally noted "in full payment" check, by endorsing such a check "with-
out prejudice" or "under protest.""0 These issues have lately ap-
peared in two court of appeal decisions.
The first of the two cases to deal with the "in full payment"
check was Eppling v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.,31 in which drawer's
check (drawn in an amount less than the payee claimed was owed)
contained on the back the words "By the endorsement hereof, payee
releases and discharges Maker [sic] from any liability or sums
claimed to be owed by Maker to Payee." Payee, however, crossed
out and rendered illegible those words, adding instead the words
"The endorsement of this check by Payee does not constitute a
release of any claims that Payee has against the Maker hereof." In
effect, the payee had sought to avoid the compromise issue by reser-
vation of his rights under Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:1-207.
When payee subsequently brought suit on the balance it alleged had
thereby remained due and unpaid, drawer defended on the basis
that a compromise had in fact bloomed when payee had negotiated
the check.32 The fourth circuit agreed with the drawer that the ac-
tion of the payee in negotiating the check had resulted in an accep-
tance of drawer's tender of the check in compromise.3
30. In Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d
85 (1969), it was said that section 1-207 could be used to avoid the common law accord
and satisfaction result by a "with reservation of rights" payee-endorsement. The opin-
ion in Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1044 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1965), had earlier uttered
similar remarks about a "deposited under protest" payee-endorsement. Professors
White and Summers have taken the view that the Baillie and Hanna dicta was correct,
o e., that section 1-207 permitted precisely the action taken by the payees in those
cases, while Chancellor Hawkland has taken the view that section 1-207 was not so in-
tended by the U.C.C. draftsmen and that the Baillie and Hanna dicta would in any
event lead to mischief by payees. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 22, § 13-21, at
452-54; Hawkland, The Effect of UCC § 1-207 on the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfac-
tion by Conditional Check, 74 COM. L.J. 329 (1969). See also Rosenthal, Discord and
Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 48
(1978); Comment, Accord and Satisfaction: Conditional Tender by Check Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 539 (1969); Comment, Does U.C.C. Sec-
tion 1-207 Apply to the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check?, 11
CREIGHTON L. REV. 515 (1977).
Since 1969, the case of A.G. King Tree Surgeons v. Deeb, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 167 (N.J.
Dist. Ct. 1976), has sided with the Hawkland view, while Scholl v. Tallman, 247
N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976), permitted a payee to avoid the defense of accord and satisfac-
tion by scratching out drawer's typed "in full payment" condition and substituting the
words "restriction of payment in full refused. $1826.65 remains due and payable." Id.
at 491. The case of Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla. App. 1978), reaches a result con-
sistent with Scholl.
31. 363 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
32. Negotiation of a check naming a payee would require an endorsement by the
named payee, bringing the drawer's notation to bear.
33. The opinion terms the legal principle urged by the payee as "estoppel by ac-
cord and satisfaction." That, as Judge Lemmon points out in the subsequent and fac-
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By proceeding upon an offer and acceptance basis, the court is
able to point out that "the payee's unilateral action in changing or
altering the [drawer's] restriction does not change the legal effect of
his negotiating the check [since] negotiation is deemed an acceptance
of the [drawer's] offer."' Thus, at its strongest, the Eppling opinion
implicitly rejects the notion that section 1-207 displaces the underly-
ing Civil Code provisions as to compromise; at its weakest, it
presages that, should the issue be squarely raised in the future, the
court will likely rule that section 1-207 does not have applicability to
the compromise issue.
The second recent case in which the "in full payment" marginal
notation issue arose is Louisiana National Bank v. Heindel,5 also
from the fourth circuit. The case is important only as a reminder
that the mere notation "payment in full" (in this case on the front of
the check), with no accompanying letter of transmittal explaining
the intended legal effect of the check, creates only a fact issue as to
which the drawer-debtor may well not prevail.'
The issue not alluded to in either Heindel or Eppling is perhaps
the more important one: what may we fairly expect the drawee
tually similar case of Louisiana National Bank v. Heindel, 365 So. 2d 37, 39 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1978) (Lemmon, J., concurring), is an unnecessary resort to common law con-
cepts, in that the Civil Code contains provisions specifically governing such cases.
Compromise is a contract provable by a showing that there was an unliquidated or
disputed claim; a tender by the debtor of payment which, if accepted by the creditor,
is understood by the creditor to be an offer of compromise; and acceptance of the
tender under those circumstances. See, e.g., Pontchartrain Park Homes v. Sewerage &
Water Bd., 246 La. 893, 168 So. 2d 595 (1964); Berger v. Quintero, 170 La. 37, 127 So.
356 (1930); Charles X. Miller, Inc. v. Oak Builders, Inc., 306 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975). A literal reading of Civil Code article 3071's language ("A ... compromise is
an agreement ... for preventing ... a lawsuit .... which [each of the parties] prefers
to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing"), leads one to doubt the cor-
rectness of the jurisprudential requirement that a compromise must be founded upon a
disputed claim; but the Louisiana Supreme Court has lately reaffirmed the require-
ment, in Wilson v. Sun Oil Co., 290 So. 2d 844 (La. 1973).
34. 363 So. 2d at 1265. Under this view, the marginal notation becomes a "condi-
tion."
35. 365 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
36. The fourth circuit remanded the case for further evidentiary proceedings,
finding the record before it insufficient to sustain the affirmative defense of "accord
and satisfaction" by the peremptory exception of res judicata. Judge Lemmon's concur-
ring opinion adds that the drawer-debtor has the burden of proving that the parties in-
tended a compromise and that this burden "is not met by showing that a debtor, in the
ordinary course of business and without additional contact or notice, simply mailed a
check to a creditor with a barely noticeable inscription regarding payment in full." 365
So. 2d at 39. This view would appear to be at odds with the recent decision of the
South Dakota Supreme Court in Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976). See
note 30, supra.
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bank to do with the "in full payment" check? 7 Can the drawee safely
pay the check in light of the fact that its customer's condition has
been scratched out? Since the drawer's expressed condition that the
check must be taken by payee-if taken at all-in "full payment"
cannot be called a restrictive endorsement," it is safe to say that
the drawee cannot ignore it." If the order of the drawer to the
drawee in Eppling is viewed as having been "pay to the order of
Eppling, if he is willing to take payment in compromise," then that
is the order to be obeyed by the drawee; hence, it must dishonor
any such check to which the payee has added a reservation of rights
stipulation.' Where the payee had obliterated or modified the
drawer's condition, the payee has altered the order of the drawer"'
and for that reason alone the item is not properly payable. Of
course, in a jurisdiction which subscribes to the view that section
1-207 permits payee reservation of rights, the drawee seemingly
would be protected if it paid the check; but, even in such a jurisdic-
tion, section 1-207 would not permit a drawee to honor an altered
check.
In the event a drawee in Louisiana were to pay an "in full pay-
ment" check which had been altered, or on which the payee had
simply added words of reservation of rights, such a payment would
be recoverable by the drawee if payee could be shown not to have
been in good faith.'3 Good faith on the part of the payee would obvi-
37. The issue is absent from the opinion in Scholl. See note 30, supra.
38. In both Heindel and Eppling, the drawer's marginal notation is referred to as
a "restrictive endorsement." 365 So. 2d at 39; 363 So. 2d at 1265. The reference in both
instances is a slip of the judicial pen; an "endorsement must be written by or on behalf
of the holder," LA. R.S. 10:3-202(2) (Supp. 1974), and the drawer is not the holder of his
own instrument. See LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp. 1974) (definition of "holder").
39. Cf. LA. R.S. 10:3-205, 3-206(2), 4-203 & 4-205(2) (Supp. 1974).
40. Banks may well be able to contract away the problem of conditional-order
checks by appropriate stipulation in the account agreement, cf. New York Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 4 App. Div. 2d
912, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1973); Kalish v. Manufacturer Trust Co., 18 Misc. 2d 958, 191
N.Y.S.2d 61 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1959), but in the absence of such a stipulation, "[o]bviously,
the bank must honor the conditions placed by the drawer on the check ... because the
bank can charge a payment to his account only if it complies with his order [and a]
bank paying a conditioned check runs the risk of the satisfaction of the condition." W.
HAWLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS 288 (1967). It is
true, on the other hand, that courts are hesitant to penalize banks that fail to observe
mere notations or memoranda on checks describing the funds, or their source, or the
payment intended by the check. See Spinazzola v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of
Detroit, 28 Mich. App. 207, 184 N.W.2d 265 (1970). Cf. Southern Baptist Hospital v.
Williams, 89 So. 2d 769 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956); Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N.Y. 359,
171 N.E. 569 (1930).
41. LA. R.S. 10:3-407 (Supp. 1974).
42. LA. R.S. 10:3-418 (Supp. 1974).
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ously be lacking in the Eppling case in light of the alteration. Even
in the case of mere addition of words or reservation of rights, it
would seem that the payee is lacking in good faith in trying to ob-
tain, as unconditional, a payment he knows was clearly intended by
the drawer to be conditional.'"
43. LA. R.S. 10:1-203 (Supp. 1974). Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901.
